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ABSTRACT This paper is a reflection on stalled union transformation in Serbia in the 
context of post-socialist transition. The empirical evidence is based on official statistics 
and representative sociological research on cohabitations and families since 2000. The 
aim is to describe some general tendencies and to suggest possible ways of interpret-
ing field results. The paper first introduces the analytical framework, consisting of 
two main theories/paradigms - a (specific) second demographic transition (SDT) and 
deprivation (POD). Through exploring and combining different sources of evidence, 
we try to cast more light on specific, blocked or very slow individualization in Ser-
bia. The main conclusion is that some changes might be identified such as: delayed 
union formation along with postponed childbearing for a vast majority of population, 
followed by a striking increase in extramarital births ever since the 1990s. The latter 
is particularly prominent among younger and disadvantaged women (less educated, 
lower social positions, from rural areas and small towns), who are, however, neither 
married nor cohabiting. On the other hand, transition into adulthood of young adults 
is protracted. Structural and institutional barriers hamper their behavioral choices as 
well as the pluralization of living arrangements, which is evident among their coun-
terparts throughout developed Europe and ex-Yugoslavia, with Slovenia excluded. 
Instead, patriarchy and strong kinship based solidarity persist in conditions of long 
lasting economic turmoil, low living standards and delayed European integrations.
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1. Introduction: Changes in partnership and family behavior
During the last 10-20 years basic trends in union formation have been converging 
throughout Europe and the developed world and they are reflected in: decline of 
marriage and fertility rates, followed by greater social acceptance of alternative liv-
ing arrangements, such as LATs (‘living apart together’)1, cohabitations (either as a 
1 LAT is close to ‘steady dating’ (Sobotka and Toulemon, 2008), referring to intimate cou-
ples who do not share dwelling. 






















prelude to marriage, post divorce form or marginal phenomenon), etc, all of which 
have produced pluralization of living arrangements, facilitated by ‘destandardiza-
tion’ in transitions into adulthood and reflexive (‘do it yourself’ biographies), (Beck, 
Giddens, Corijn and Klijzing, 2001). Not only has the entry into marriage been 
delayed, but greater family instability has occurred as well (increased divorce and 
remarriage), with rising shares of young couples without children, singles, step par-
enthood, post-familial forms, reconstituted unions, etc (Pongratz and Spéder, 2008, 
Sobotka and Toulemon, 2008, Sobotka, 2008, Roseneil and Budgeon, 2004).
However, despite the convergence in behavior towards partnership and family, 
there is also evidence of persisting differences among European countries, in line 
with geopolitical divisions, diverse historical background and cultural features, so-
cial hierarchies, welfare states, cohorts’ effects, etc (Kuijsten, 1996, Boh, 1987). A 
steep fall in total first marriage rates, accompanied by an increase in mean age of en-
try into unions and widely spread cohabitations, with rising shares of children born 
in these unions, first occurred in the 1960s in Northwestern Europe, disseminated 
to the Western part in the 1970s, and only in the 1990s emerged both in Southern 
Europe and in the countries of post-socialist transition. Extramarital childbearing 
typically started within disadvantaged social groups and was afterwards adopted by 
higher social strata (Perelli - Harris et al, 2010, Perelli – Harris and Gerber, 2011), 
but vice versa, as well. Namely, in some regions and countries (in Northern Europe) 
it was initiated by urban intelligentsia (young adults, higher educated, opting for 
liberal views, gender equality, minority rights etc), (Prinz, 1995, Lestheaghe, Neidert, 
Surkyn, 2006, etc), who were trendsetters and then was adopted by lower strata or 
from central urban areas towards inner parts of a country.
Despite the decline in universality of marriage, the vast majority of population even 
in countries depicted as forerunners (like Sweden) still perceive conjugal union 
as an end goal and optimal life style (Oláh and Bernhardt, 2008). Marriage has 
nevertheless lost its significance as the marker of transition into adulthood, deline-
ation of relationships between men and women, source of personal identity, and 
the prerequisite for reproduction (Sobotka and Toulemon, 2008; Kuhar and Reiter, 
2010). Greater sexual freedom for young adults, their increased mobility, rights to 
privacy granted in parental home, elevated wellbeing of parents’ household, higher 
social tolerance towards alternative living arrangements, prolonged the transition 
into adulthood, due to higher and longer education and investment in personal hu-
man capital, combined with tight labor market opportunities, all of these have both 
weakened the pressure for leaving parental home and reinforced the differentiation 
of patterns of family formation and partnership behavior across Europe (ibidem). 
So called de-standardization of transition into adulthood in terms of early separation 
from parents’ household, frequent cohabitation and LAT in their 20s and early 30s, 
late start of family formation is more pronounced in Northern and Western regions, 
while in countries of Southern Europe and those in post socialist transformation, 
a model of protracted transition and entry into marriages directly, i.e. while living 
with family of procreation is more pronounced (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Balkan States, ex Soviet Republics, etc).






















When speaking about Serbia, demographic trends in union formation are similar 
to the EU - 27, with decline of marriage universality and fall of fertility ever since 
the 1970s, the trends that have been even more salient since the beginning of the 
post-socialist transition in the 1990 and since 2000. However, divorces are rare and 
only in recent years an increase in their number and ratio have been registered 
(Kuhar and Reiter, 2010), the trend which has been explained through the ‘crisis’ 
argument. Namely, conserving (current) unions and avoiding their dissolution have 
been identified as a coping strategy aimed at combating the hardships of every-
day living related to prolonged and still uncompleted social transformation into 
market economy (job losses and high unemployment, massive impoverishment of 
population, low levels of economic and social capital of individuals and families, 
social disorganization, corruption and criminalization, particularly in the 1990s, etc), 
(Milić et al, 2004; Bobić, 2004). Families of procreation and orientation are highly 
interdependent, which is also the case in Southern Europe and is intertwined with 
poor welfare state and low level of state support to (young) people (Di Giulio, and 
Rosina, 2007; Kuhar and Reiter, ibidem). As many as one out of three households in 
Serbia contain more than one nuclear family (with one or both parents living with 
married children, or a divorced child, or married siblings living together, etc). This 
trend towards family re-unification and re-enforcement particularly since 1991 has 
also been interpreted as a part of a coping strategy in a country whose population 
has faced severe pauperization due to economic restructuring, sharp decline of qual-
ity of livelihood2, political turmoil and delayed integration into the global economy 
(Milić et al, 2005; Milić et al, 2010)3.
At the same time, non-marital births have increased significantly (from 8% in 1950 
to 13.1% in 1990 up to 22.8% in 2008), (Penev and Stanković, 2010a and 2010b) 
although not as strongly as in some other transitional countries, e.g. Slovenia (see 
Kuhar and Reiter, 2010). Namely, in the same period in Slovenia these shares in-
creased from 24.5% to 52.8%, in Hungary from 13.1% to 39.5% and in Bulgaria from 
12.4% to 51.1%. Serbia is similar to Poland (rise from 6.2% to 19.9%), Moldova (from 
11.1% up to 22.3%), Russia (14.6% in 1990 to 26.9% in 2008) and Ukraine (11.2% to 
20.9%). When compared to the EU countries, the increase in Serbia can be assessed 
as similar to: Italy, Spain and Portugal (in 1990, 6.3%, 9.6% and 14.7% respectively 
while in 2008, the following increase has been evidenced: 17.7% (2007 in Italy), in 
Spain 31.7% and in Portugal 33.6% (2008) (Stanković and Penev, 2010a:17).
However, while in the majority of developed European countries, extramarital births 
occur within cohabitations, in Serbia, on the contrary, a vast majority of these chil-
dren live within single parent families. Cohabitations are very rare in Serbia, repre-
senting as few as 1.6-2% of all households (RZS; Bobić, 2006, 2012; Stanković and 
2 Today Serbia still has not reached GDP from 1989. Before economic crisis in 2008 it 
approached to the level of 80% (Petrović, 2011) 
3 These findings on extended families, their relationships, the position of young families 
therein, gender roles, etc, have been broadly discussed by local researchers (Miletić-Stepa-
nović, V., 2011).






















Penev, 2010a and 2010b; Tomanović, S., et al, 2012). Among the countries of ex-
Yugoslavia, Slovenia is the only one where extramarital births are high and tightly 
related to cohabitation, while the average share of these extra-marital unions in the 
region as a whole is as few as 4% (Kuhar and Reiter, 2010). Nonetheless in other 
countries of post-socialist transformation the share of cohabitating households is 
higher: in Estonia, in the age groups: 25-29 and 30-34 (41.4.% and 28.07%), in Slo-
venia (27.1 and 17.2% respectively), in Hungary (21.2 and 12.7%), in Romania (11.5 
and 7.8%) while they are lower in the Czech Republic (8.7% and 5.7%), Poland (4.4 
and 2.5%) and Slovakia (3.7 and 2.9%), (Pongracz and Spéder, 2008). 
Sociological surveys, carried out in 2003 and 2007 by the Institute for Sociological 
Research of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade (Milić, et al, 2004, 2005, 2010; 
Bobić, 2006; Petrović, 2010), indicated that single mothers (whether divorced and/
or unmarried) most frequently reside within complex family households, therefore 
leaning onto parents’ and relatives’ support and their multiple resources, economic 
and social capitals (33% and 32.4% respectively). 
Therefore the question arises as to how these developments of conserving and 
reinforcing the family on the one hand and the emergence of single motherhood 
on the other, could be interpreted4? Another reason to study the Serbian case is to 
shed more light since the country has yet not been encompassed by any of the great 
surveys carried out recently, such as FFS or GGS5. This paper will first introduce the 
theoretical framework that seems most relevant for further interpretation of empiri-
cal evidence in Serbia. In the next part a secondary analysis of field data of two 
major sociological surveys and referent demographic study of extramarital child-
bearing will be presented. A special attention will be paid to value orientations of 
the younger and older couples in order to try to illuminate the shifts in attitudes on 
the continuum conservativism/liberalism. Finally we will arrive to an overall conclu-
sion aimed at discussing the main argument on specific and blocked modernization 
(diversification) of unions that is reflected in both stalled transitions into adulthood 
and persistence of low fertility. Based on comparative statistical data (Kuhar and 
Reiter, 2010) and our research, we come to a tentative argument that there are ob-
viously predominantly structural reasons which are responsible for the family and 
fertility behavior in Serbia, primarily a lack of life opportunities and inadequate state 
support. Still we highlight value dimensions depicted here as personal inconsisten-
cies (mismatch of traditionalism and modernism), which though not as important 
as socio-economic, work behind the scene hampering faster future transformations. 
4 Some leading local sociologists and feminists coined the term of ‘re-traditionalization’ of 
Serbian family (Milić, 2004, 2010, Blagojević, 2012, etc).
5 Although a thorough (multi – layer) analysis of fertility and family transformation as well 
as the underlying causes (material standards, institutionalist and idealist change) has been 
performed through by using various sources and data (CoE, ILO, UNICEF, European Value 
Survey and World Value Survey, EVS/WVS 1999/2001) for all ex-Yugoslav countries by Kuhar 
and Reiter (2010) 























The paradigm of second demographic transition (SDT), (Leastheaghe, 2010; Mc-
Donalds, Macura and Haug, 2005; Leastheaghe and Moors; 2000, etc) is usually 
deployed to explain major population change in contemporary advanced market 
economies by way of weakening of the (‘bourgeois’) family, a trend which is caused 
by (second) modernization, increased independence of women (in sexuality, eco-
nomic wellbeing, personal freedom, gender performance) and major cultural shifts 
(secularization, individualization), (Fokkema and Liefbroer, 2008:1354)6. Liefbroer 
(1999, cf Corijn and Klijzing, 2001:5) has pointed out five major shifts in the eco-
nomic and social structure related to SDT: the expansion of education, the increase 
in labor force participation of women, economic developments, the creation and 
then revision of welfare state and changes in economic factors. These structural 
developments were followed by cultural shifts, identified by Liefbroer (ibidem) such 
as: the decrease in normative controls of behavior, increased individualization and 
re-emergence of feminism. 
The stronger the welfare state the greater the impact of SDT (the case of Northern 
and Western Europe). Conversely, countries with prevailing pro-familism and weak 
welfare mechanisms experience less of SDT (case of Mediterranean countries), (Di 
Giulio, and Rosina, 2007). 
Three main features of the Mediterranean model are prominent (Fokkema and Lief-
broer, 2008; Ule and Kuhar, 2008). Firstly, young adults stay in the parental home for 
a protracted period and enter marriages directly, without a phase of living on their 
own, in cohabiting unions, etc. Secondly, entry into marriage coincides with con-
ception and first birth, indicating that it is the momentum when individual becomes 
mature or adult, no matter whether young person leaves parental home or continues 
to live with family of procreation (Petrović, 2004; Tomanović and Ignatovic, 2004; 
Ignjatovic, 2009). This makes the countries of Southern Europe renowned for a ‘kin-
ship alliance family pattern’ (Sobotka, 2008:173). In particular childbearing is post-
poned and parenthood is treated as a great responsibility, both of which lead to very 
low fertility rates (TFR of 1.28 in Greece, of 1.23 in Italy and of 1.20 in Spain), (Fok-
kema and Liefbroer, 2008:1355). With regards to Serbia, population behavior is close 
to Mediterranean model with very low fertility rates (TFR in 2010, 1.40), delayed 
entries into marriage, protracted living with parents and transition into adulthood for 
both man and women. The postponement of family formation takes part until the 
ages of 31-35, when majority of young people eventually reach their (residential or 
psychological) separation from a family of origin (Tomanović, et al, 2012). 
When considering post-socialist transition countries it seems difficult to place them 
as a unique group within the SDT trajectory (Coleman, 2005; Philipov and Dorbritz, 
2003; Stankuniene and Maslauskaite, 2008; Sobotka, 2008, Petrović, 2011; Kuhar 
6 In this paper we focus on union formation and avoid discussing the other dimensions of 
SDT concerning ageing, mortality trends, immigration, etc. 






















and Reiter, 2010). They are following diverse and specific paths of SDT, determined 
by their structural (economic and social) changes, as stated by the ‘crisis paradigm’ 
(Philipov and Dorbritz, 2003). Secondly, the ideational crisis caused by the destruc-
tion of state socialism is significant in determining family changes in these countries 
(ibid). Sobotka argues that countries in transition demonstrate some common but 
also some particular features of SDT pattern (2008:193). These are: 1) The late oc-
currence of many behavioral and value changes typical of the transition, especially 
those related to alternative living arrangements; 2) The speed at which many fea-
tures of this transition emerged during the 1990s; 3) The importance of structural 
and economic factors, especially in the early stage of the transition; and 4) The im-
portance of disadvantaged social groups in the spread of some of the new types of 
family behavior, especially non-marital childbearing and, in many cases, unmarried 
cohabitation. 
Following Sobotka’s argument we can understand the rising portion of mothers of 
children born out of wedlock in Serbia as ‘unwilling vanguards’ of new, liberalized 
behavior under conditions of social deprivation, which is common among countries 
behind the former Iron Curtain (Sobotka, 2008:171). “Whereas lower educated in-
dividuals often embrace values that can be characterized as rather traditional, they 
also frequently manifest family behavior associated with the transition, such as non-
marital childbearing, high partnership instability, and high prevalence of long-term 
cohabitation” (ibid.:171). Similarly Perelli - Harris at al (2010) apply the pattern of 
deprivation (POD) as a leading paradigm which fills the gap of the second demo-
graphic transition theory. Namely although the latter explains the change in familial 
behavior related to social and economic improvement and ideational shifts of sec-
ond modernization and post-materialism, it does not sufficiently take into account 
disadvantages linked to globalization in terms of economic uncertainty, poverty, 
restricted access to social welfare and lower levels of education for many social 
groups, since 1980s and 1990s. Although the proponents of SDT concept accentu-
ated higher educated women and social groups as the forerunners, the reality is that 
cohabitation and extramarital childbearing has become more common among less 
educated in most countries of Europe ever since 1970s (except in Italy and southern 
European countries with overall low prevalence of the phenomenon). Therefore it 
seems that deprivation has been more suitable paradigm that allows better interpre-
tation of greater likelihood of conceiving and giving birth to children in cohabita-
tion and out of marriage. The question arises as to why women with less secure 
livelihood, possessing lower level of resources (material, economic, social, cultural), 
living in unstable partnerships decide to give birth? As Perelli - Harris advocates, 
‘becoming a mother’ is ‘a way to find a meaning of life’, so these women ‘grab ea-
gerly at the surest source of accomplishment within their reach’ (Perelli-Harris, B., 
et al, 2010:797). To the contrary, higher educated women opt for marriage, looking 
for stability, which makes them to delay family building, because of investments in 
personal reflexive biographies (prolonged education, career building, etc) and quest 
for suitable partner. Cohabiting couple usually lack resources to convert their rela-
tionship into marriage, hence Perelli – Harris et al (2010:797) come to the following 
conclusion: A wish to have a child combined with financial obstacles for getting 
married and less secure relationship creates negative connection of education and 
childbearing in cohabitation. By way of building her own future around mother-






















hood, without counting on a father of her child and her partner, a woman gains 
chances for self actualization and social respect in a globalized world of permanent 
uncertainty and risks (ibid). 
3. Data and methods
Our analysis is founded on two main sources of data, which will be combined: of-
ficial statistics and results of two surveys, carried out by the Institute for sociologi-
cal research of the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade in 2003 and 2008. 
Therefore the main method is quantitative (descriptive statistics) and secondary 
analysis7.
The sample of the population investigated in 2003 was nationally representative and 
included 1635 households (Milić, eds, 2004), represented by an adult member. The 
questionnaire was very extensive and covered a wide array of topics in two main 
domains: structural changes related to PST (process of privatization, economic sur-
vival strategies among urban and rural actors, social stratification, etc) and coping 
strategies of families and households (economic strategies, housing strategies, mar-
riage and family behavior and transformation, parenthood and ageing).
Another sociological survey undertaken in 2008 treated topics related only to fam-
ily transformation in Serbia. The sample consisted of 1212 households (Milić, eds, 
2010). It was constructed to be nationally representative for two groups of families 
of ‘younger stage’ and ‘older stage’ couples (those who had entered unions 1-5 years 
and 15-20 years prior to the survey). A complex questionnaire was constructed, cover-
ing different topics (interactions within families, intergenerational cohesion and con-
flicts, value orientations, social and cultural capitals of individuals and families, etc). 
4. Results: Blocked de-standardization of partnerships
Analysis of empirical evidence combined with demographics (census and vital data) 
revealed that marriage has been the predominant life style of Serbian population. 
Thus as many as 63.3% of respondents of the survey were married, followed by 
never married (17.6%) and widowed (12.3%), while divorced were the least numer-
ous (5.4%), (Table 1). A substantial downward trend of married population has also 
been evidenced in census data, along with a mild and somewhat stronger increase 
in the respective shares of the divorced and the widowed, while the number of the 
unmarried registered the highest growth with a leap of full 4-5%. Marriage decline 
is due to its postponement and rise of never married, all of which, combined with 
persistently low fertility and prolonged longevity of overall population results in the 
aging of marriageable generations.
7 Besides these two surveys, we also took into account the results of other colleagues’ empiri-
cal works, whenever necessary, in order to boost our interpretations. Results of our qualitative 
research on cohabitations carried out in 2002 will also be partially mentioned. 























Serbian population, by marital structure, 2003
Never 
married Married Divorced Widowed Others
* Total
% 17.6 63.3 5.4 12.3 1.4 100.0
% Census data 
1991 20.0 67.3 3.6 9.1 / 100.0
2002 24.8 60.5 4.2 10.5 100.0
Source: Calculated on the basis of the 2003 empirical research and census data, Statistical office of Republic 
of Serbia
Table 2.
Partnership status of respondents, Serbia, 2003
Cohabitations




born out of 
wedlock 
Total
% 1.9 0.8 0.6 0.8 4.1
Source: Same as Table 1.
The survey from 2003 introduced a wider concept of partnership other than usual 
four categories used in Serbian censuses8 which enabled us to estimate the fre-
quency of non-marital unions. Additional concepts covered three forms: 1) ‘steady 
dating’9; 2) cohabitations; and 3) cohabitations with a child(ren) born out of wed-
lock. As few as only 4% of all respondents reported living in non-marital unions 
(table 2). Among the latter, ‘steady dating’ was the most numerous (1.9% out of 
4%). Cohabitations were less numerous and they included almost equal shares of 
premarital (0.8%) and post-divorce forms (0.6%)10. Cohabitations with children born 
out of wedlock were the rarest (0.8%). 
This finding of rare practice of alternative unions confirmed our proposition of 
blocked or stalled transformation of a conjugal-family paradigm. Qualitative research 
of upper three forms of partnership carried out in 2002 in Belgrade, disclosed that 
8 Only the last census in 2011 introduced cohabitations. The results haven’t however been 
presented yet when this text has been worked out. 
9 As Sobotka and Toulemon propose (2008), this concept is similar to LAT. However we 
deem the previous one as better reflecting unwilling co-residence with parents and lack of 
freedom of choice to live on one’s own or with a partner, i.e. separately. 
10 Census data in 2002 revealed exactly the same share of cohabitations (1.6%), the figure that 
was derived from the share of households consisted of non-relatives. 
* There were 1.4% kinship based households, but without a family nucleus. The discrepancy 
in figures between census and empirical data stem from the fact that the main subject of 
census collection data is the individual, while our research tackled a household. Besides, the 
most recent data from census 2011 were still unavailable while writing this paper.






















these unions were ‘trial marriages’, whose proponents were young adults up to their 
30s11. These unions can be characterized as quasi-modern, since it was only their 
form that indicated some shift while in their essence they were highly traditional, 
with asymmetric gender roles and patriarchal perspectives when planning future 
life-course of both men and women. More specifically the whole system was cen-
tered predominantly on (future) parenting of a couple and less on reflexive biogra-
phies of partnership (Bobić, 2003).
The increase of never married, combined with the low share of non marital partner-
ships reinforce the argument on protracted transitions to adulthood, which is similar 
to Slovenia and other Mediterranean countries, as well (Ule and Kuhar, ibid.). When 
asked about the reasons for non-marrying and/or postponing family formation, most 
interviewees claimed a lack of material resources and housing on one hand and the 
absence of a ‘proper’ partner on the other. Almost none opted for non-marriage as 
a permanent life style (0.5%). Authors also underlined independent housing as a 
major precondition for childbearing, then the education and employment status of 
youth in the third place (Kuhar and Reiter, 2010).
Due to structural and institutional barriers, Serbian young people are faced with a 
lack of chances and choices, particularly in their 20s and even 30s, which is, inter 
alia, reflected in the absence of diversity of living arrangements, and therefore, stand-
ardized transition into adulthood, pressure to delay and postpone events. The hous-
ing transition is blocked because a vast majority of young adults are living with their 
parents or relatives, which is hampering their family formation process12. Another 
structural barrier is a shortage of available social housing opportunities. In 2005 the 
state introduced the subvention credit lines to facilitate purchase of apartments by 
young couples (younger than 35), but, up to date, this chance was utilized by only 
4%, while only some 7% can afford to rent dwelling in a private sector, because of 
high unemployment, lack of stable and well paid jobs, economic crisis in 2008, etc.
Transition from education into employment is also very unfavorable (Labor Force 
Survey, 2011, cf. Mojić, 2012:307). According to official data of the National Employ-
ment Agency of the Republic of Serbia, unemployment rates for young generations 
are permanently around 50% throughout 2000s. In 2011, activity rate for the work 
force (15-64) was 58.9%, with employment rate 45.5%, while unemployment rate 
was 22.9%. When speaking of generations aged 15-24 and 25-34, activity rates were 
11 The case study design encompassed 30 couples, the sample based on theoretical satura-
tion principle. It proved the hypothesis of cohabitations as trial marriage or a last phase in a 
courtship (Mills, M, 2000), a style that was mostly familiar among urban intelligentsia, young, 
well educated young man and women, who altogether with their families of origin and infor-
mal network possessed a high human and social capitals (Prinz, 1995). 
12 Another representative sociological survey carried out in 2000 demonstrated that 47% of 
young, married couples start their unions living with parents, regardless of their economic 
standard and social position and 37% in their own apartment. However in as many as 90% of 
those living on their own, it was enabled by the support of parents and/or relatives (Petrović, 
2011). Case study on cohabiting couple undertaken in 2002 in Belgrade showed that they 
mostly lived in apartments or dwelling of parents or grandparents and relatives, and were 
prone to enter marriage around 30 once they decide to have a baby (Bobić, 2003). 






















28.1% and 77.8% respectively, employment rates 14.1% and 54.2% and unemploy-
ment rates 49.9 and 30.3%, respectively. 
Higher education has also become a far reaching goal for many young people in 
Serbia. Therefore, while in countries of developed Europe, majority of their coun-
terparts invest in higher education and human capital accumulation, this strategy is 
hardly accessible in Serbia. Namely as many as 39% of children whose fathers are 
members of the elite (politicians, managers, etc) will retain the same position, while 
the chances of the lowest class (manual workers and farmers) to climb up the social 
ladder onto the top of it are minor (2,2% and 7.9%). If we follow datasets for the pe-
riod 1989 – 2003 - 2012, we can realize that social classes have been shrinking and 
closing, with an increased rate of slipping to lower positions, due to economic crisis 
and negative growth. Self reproduction of higher class and professionals (upper 
middle) is evidenced (Cvejić, 2012). The education does not operate as a channel of 
social promotion. Instead of it, combination of social, cultural and economic capitals 
of family of procreation is acting as a broad avenue. There are some stipends and 
credits for secondary and high education, but as research reveals, their beneficiar-
ies become (again) children from the upper social classes, since they have better 
grades, which appear to be the main precondition for their admission (Tomanović, 
2010, Tomanović et al, 2012). Since higher resources of a family of procreation have 
a crucial importance for school success of children, those deprivileged or from an 
underclass (lower education and social capital, impoverished, disabled, immigrants, 
minority groups, Roma, in particular) are mostly excluded. 
Social biographies of young people in Serbia are created within very unfavorable 
societal context, with almost lack of support of institutional mechanisms and the 
state and the massive reliance on informal networks, the latter being a part of Medi-
terranean and Southern European cultural area (Tomanović, et al, 2012:312).
However, despite these obstacles, as stated above, there is an increase of extra-
marital childbearing – a transitional phenomenon registered in other post socialistic 
countries. A relevant source of evidence comes from extensive demographic analy-
ses (Penev and Stanković, 2010a and 2010b). Their findings confirm our previous 
results that vast majority of these children were born by single mothers, i.e. women 
who do not have/live with a partner. The number of children who were legally rec-
ognized by their biological fathers has been varying in Serbia, from more than half 
in 1960s, to less than 30% in 1990, with slight increase in 2000s (41.4% in 2004). The 
crucial argument to the claim that these children were residing with lone mothers is 
very low rates of entering into legal unions (marriages) of these women. Namely, as 
few as 6.2% unmarried mothers in Vojvodina and only 1.7% in Serbia, central part, 
married the father of their children, which is several times rarer compared to 1960s 
(31.2% and 14.3% respectively). As to the characteristics of mothers of children born 
out of wedlock (Penev and Stanković, 2010b) the highest likelihood to give birth has 
a younger generation of women, 21 years, on average. The child is usually the only 
one and these women mostly come from rural areas and lower social strata (either 
unemployed or maiden) with predominantly primary or secondary education13.
13 The share of the rural population in Serbia in 2009 is estimated to be quite high, 41.75% 
(RZS) 






















The European research carried out in eight countries (Germany, France, Italy, UK, 
Netherlands, Norway, Austria and Russia) has also confirmed this tendency of less 
educated, who face greater precariousness due to processes of globalization, eco-
nomic uncertainties and shrinking of social protection to opt for extramarital child-
bearing, regardless of partnership as the only way of self realization and meaning 
of life (Perelli - Harris, et al., 2010; Petrović, 2011). It seems that disadvantaged and 
deprived social groups, women in particular, with less cultural, social and human 
capital, adapt themselves to the shifting social milieu that cannot be controlled for 
in any other way except by this personal choice.
5. Conservativism vs. (weak) liberalism
Changes in dominant preferences are recognized as one of the underlying societal 
causes in both SDT and POD paradigms. Therefore we decided to include the em-
pirical evidence on value profile of Serbian population. 
Respondents/couples investigated in the survey 2008 were presented with a list of 
14 statements on: family, marriage, masculinity, femininity and children’s well-being, 
and were asked to select one among 5 options (on a Lickert type scale) that best 
fitted their viewpoints. The range of their responses varied from ‘strongly agree’, to 
‘mostly agree’, ‘don’t know’, up to ‘mostly disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. Some of 
the main results are presented in tables 3 and 4.
Table 3
Gender roles and unions, attitudes of respondent/partner
Statement**
Level of agree-




A woman is fulfilled only once she be-
comes a mother 47.6 64.7 0.000 0.212 54.503
It is natural and self evident that a man has 
more sexual freedom than a woman 26.1 14.1 0.000 0.254 77.905
If only one spouse/partner is employed 
than it is more natural to be the husband 63.2 51.2 0.000 0.171 35.242
For a happy child it is important that both 
mother and father live together and raise 
it up 
82.6 70.6 0.000 0.144 24.951
Marriage is an outdated institution 20.2 26.1 0.000 0.134 21.773
Married people are generally happier than 
unmarried ones 31.2 19.8 0.000 0.139 23.391
It is good that men and women are equal 
but men should have the last word 39.5 15.6 0.000 0.331 131.420
Note: Levels of agreement are calculated by summing up the shares of those who ‘strongly agree’ and 
‘mostly agree’
Source: own calculations 
** Due to the lack of space, a list of 14 statements has been halved to only 7 where statisti-
cally significant links between variables have been disclosed.






















The apparent slow down of the transformation process in Serbia has been re-
flected in the analysis demonstrated in tables 3 and 4. Firstly, it is important to 
emphasize that there were no significant discrepancies between sub-samples of 
‘early stage’ and ‘late stage’ couples, which we found pretty unexpected. The only 
difference, not so strong, though, was registered regarding the attitudes toward 
divorce. Namely, slightly more ‘late stage’ couples (55.6%) advocated for a divorce 
in case when a couple cannot find a solution of their conflicts, compared to 43.2% 
of ‘early stage’ ones. These attitudes could also mirror the onset of shifts, when 
considering a modest rise in divorces (divorces per 100 marriages) which has been 
noticed recently. Besides, family instability related to second demographic transi-
tion might have been initiated through a rise of marriage breakdown intertwined 
with a delay of the first unions and increase of cohabitation (Lesthaeghe, 2010). 
The lack of differences in attitudes among two groups of couples could also be 
interpreted by way of the including the interpretation gained through case study of 
transformation of partnerships (Bobić, 2003). The latter qualitative study disclosed 
that cohabitations were trial marriages tending to transform into legal ones when a 
first child was to arrive. It has been depicted as the momentum when partners give 
up their previously practiced (post)modernism in terms of: gender equity, women’s 
career prospects, etc and the whole dyad system becomes asymmetric and child 
centered eventually. Therefore a lack of major discrepancy in between two marital 
cohorts might not be a surprise, although, of course, more investigation of the issue 
is definitely needed. 
(Pre)-modern preferences of the respondents have been reflected in ideals of a com-
plete conjugal family, as well as femininity and masculinity. Liberal or (post) modern 
orientations, although modest, are also present when speaking of sexual freedoms, 
authority and adoption of non marital unions. 
As to the gender differences, females showed more conservative views when focus-
ing on a motherhood as a major act of self actualization. More than half of them 
(64.7%) advocated for the statement ‘a woman is fulfilled only once she becomes a 
mother’. As many as 2/3 of them consider complete family as a precondition for a 
happy childhood and more than half of them still idealize a ‘husband provider and 
wife care giver’ model (51.2%). However, it seems that patriarchy has been chal-
lenged. Twice less wives compared to husbands are likely to admit greater sexual 
freedom for male (14.1%), and as many of them reject male authority (15.6%). Slight-
ly more wives than husbands consider marriage to be an outdated institution. On 
the contrary, it looks that more proponents of traditionalistic sentiments are found 
among men compared to women. Namely, husbands showed greater proneness to 
gender asymmetry and inequality in unions, as reflected on all the items in table 3, 
except for the first one. 
Persisting patriarchy is also evidenced in the next table 4. Although a positive cor-
relation in between higher resistance of traditionalism and social position has been 
confirmed in this survey, there is still an evident prevalence of pro-familism among 
elites. 




























square Low Middle High 
Care of children is primarily 
a mother’s duty and then a 
father’s
65.2 43.5 22.6 0.000 0.209 90.186
Abortion should be legally 
forbidden 49.2 29.1 20.8 0.000 0.144 43.166
A woman is fulfilled only once 
she becomes a mother 74.2 59.8 45.5 0.000 0.144 42.951
It is natural and self evident 
that a man has more sexual 
freedom than a woman
23.1 22.7 13.5 0.000 0.131 35.798
If only one spouse/partner 
is employed than it is more 
natural to be the husband 
76.9 62.3 44.1 0.000 0.172 61.469
It is not convenient for unmar-
ried couples to live together 33.8 16.2 13.1 0.000 0.146 43.943
A pre-school child whose 
mother is employed is likely 
to suffer 
32.3 23.8 13.8 0.000 0.134 37.306
For a happy child it is impor-
tant that both mother and 
father live together and raise 
it up 
87.9 81.1 70.5 0.000 0.118 28.665
Note: Note: Levels of agreement are calculated by summing up the shares of those who ‘strongly agree’ and 
‘mostly agree’
Source: own calculations 
Namely, as many as 70.5% of highly positioned couples opt for an intact nuclear 
family when a child’s wellbeing is at stake, and there are no great differences com-
pared to their middle and low counterparts. Almost half of couples from high strata 
(45.5%) hold conservative viewpoints about women’s self realization and as many of 
them deem ‘male provider’ model to be an optimal family strategy. However, when 
prioritizing care of minors they are three times less conservative (22.6%) compared 
to their counterparts from low strata (65.2%). 
Couples from all social strata do not widely accept the model of unemployed moth-
er, although differences persist. Almost twice more couples from lower (32.3%) 
14 Due to the lack of space we selected only statements with statistically significant links. 
When analyzing the dataset a synthetic variable of a social position of a couple was con-
structed, based on aggregated data on: housing conditions, economic status, overall income, 
education and occupation. 






















compared to upper strata (13.8%) accept the model, while those from the middle 
are in between (23.8%). This norm of a working mother is inherited from the previ-
ous system of state socialism where the dual income was needed in order to secure 
wellbeing of a household. 
Opposition toward non marital unions is not so strong. Slightly more than one out 
of three low posited partner resists them (33.8%), while the shares of those coming 
from the other two strata are almost twice rarer (16.2 and 13.1% respectively). Simi-
lar results are gained when considering gender inequality through greater sexual 
freedom for males (see table above). 
When analyzing preferences, particularly of those better off, usually depicted as van-
guards or trendsetters of social change, our results however evidence ambivalence. 
It might be linked to socio economic turmoil, permanent uncertainty and political 
crisis, ever since 1990s, which contributed to creation of a normative and behavioral 
mismatch. Due to long lasting economic instability, prolonged and uncompleted pri-
vatization processes, frequent fluctuations in labor market, etc., partners were often 
unwillingly pressed to take over tasks and responsibilities in both paid jobs and care 
work, despite their deeply rooted gendered standards and expectations. 
On the other hand, it should be stressed here that one comprehensive descriptive 
study of demographic change and their underlying causes in ex-Yugoslav countries 
has also come to an unexpected conclusion on almost lack of effect of values. Meas-
ured dimensions such as: traditionalism vs, secularism-rationalism and materialism 
(survival) vs. self expression have not demonstrated influence on family formation 
behavior, so the authors tentatively concluded that materialist determinants i.e. so-
cio-economic background is still highly prominent (Kuhar and Reiter, 2010). 
To reinforce our field results we will sum up by showing the general findings on 
attitudes and comparing them with other investigations. Almost equal portions of 
couples in our research 2008 have been classified as ‘traditionalists with features of 
modernism’ (47.1%) and ‘modernists with traditionalist residuals’ (47.3%). 
Very similar results have been demonstrated in other representative surveys carried 
out in Serbia and western Balkans (Pavlović, 2009, Pešić, 2009, Petrović, 2011). By 
investigating the materialist and post-materialist orientations, Pavlović (2009) arrived 
to the conclusion that around 47% of the respondents represented a mixture of both. 
There were quite few ‘core’ pre-modernists (2.1%) but also ‘pure’ post-modernists 
(3.6%), while Pešić and Petrović have argued that, when speaking of family and 
gender relations, a clear decline in patriarchal orientation has been evident since the 
beginning of 2000, whereas those related to authoritarianism and collectivism are 
still prevalent15. Scholars offered the interpretation that this might probably be due 
to collectivist sentiments inherited from the recent socialist past, as well as cultural 
backgrounds and national memories. 
15 The traditionalism, nationalism and patriarchy were particularly strong in the 1990s. 























By presenting empirical evidence and its discussion we aimed to document some 
specific features of ongoing family transformation in Serbia. The focus has been 
primarily on the change in the pattern of partnerships, because fertility decline is an 
almost universal (European and Western) phenomenon, while the diversification in 
unions is still persistent (Boh, 1987; Kuijsten, 1996; Petrović, 2011). 
Compared to European countries (including those in post-socialist transition), Ser-
bia can be identified as a ‘late starter’ on the trajectory of SDT (Leastheaghe, 2010; 
Jones, 2007). The accumulation of unfavorable processes: huge and long lasting 
social deprivation, low material standards of living and slow economic recovery, 
lack of “chances and biographic choices” (Kuhar and Reiter, 2010), all these dete-
riorate lives of majority of population and youth in particular. Those from the up-
per and middle social strata are however highly cautious about their reproductive 
decisions, although, unlike the rest of citizens, they widely advocate self- actualiza-
tion and female emancipation. Hence their main strategy is obviously awaiting and 
postponement16. On the other hand, those from lower social strata and the disad-
vantaged adapt to structural constraints in their own way, by unwillingly embracing 
new, liberalized behavior such as non marital births, divorce and single parenthood. 
Therefore some authors argue that their behaviors reflect drives which can be bet-
ter interpreted through paradigm of deprivation combined with value liberalization 
and permissiveness. Such value shifts have been instigated by social transition and 
linked with overall uncertainty and demise of protective measures from previous 
state socialism. Due to similar constraints, an increasing share of people who stay 
out of unions and childless throughout their lives has been registered in censuses 
2002-2011.
Gender inequality is still prevalent, as in other countries in transition, driven by ‘the 
patriarchally - biased socio-political systems that seemingly privilege the interests of 
men more than those of women’ (Kligman, 1996, cf Stankuniene and Maslauskaite, 
2008). Nonetheless ongoing shifts towards post-traditionalism are reflected in every-
day life change and have been documented in field research. Notwithstanding indi-
vidualization processes, stronger social support, state policies and proper measures 
have to be put in force in order to boost personal choices, female’s emancipation 
and reconciliation of work and family for both genders and throughout the life 
course. Social intervention is particularly needed to enable young people’s faster 
transition into adulthood (through employment, union formation, career pursuit, 
separation from families of origin, etc), if they are expected to become the frontrun-
ners of modernization and social change. 
16 The sociological study on transition into adulthood in 2004 showed that young people in 
Serbia delay marriage until around 30 and after that they enter unions with the strong support 
of families of procreation (Tomanović and Ignjatović, 2004). The postponement in fertility has 
particularly been pronounced during the 1990s and resumed until today as a result the vast 
majority of newborns are children of first parity children (Raševic, 2006) 
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Specifična (blokirana) postsocijalistička transformacija životne zajednice u 
Srbiji
Sažetak
Tekst se bavi zaustavljenom transformacijom životne zajednice u kontekstu postsocijalističke 
tranzicije. Empirijski su dokazi utemeljeni na službenoj statistici i reprezentativnom socio-
loškom istraživanju o kohabitaciji i obitelji nakon 2000. godine. Cilj je rada bio opisati opće 
tendencije i predložiti moguću interpretaciju rezultata terenskog istraživanja. Najprije pred-
stavljamo analitički okvir koji se sastoji od dviju glavnih teorija/paradigmi – (specifična) druga 
demografska tranzicija (SDT) i deprivacija (POD). Ispitivanjem i kombiniranjem različitih izvo-
ra, pokušali smo bolje osvijetliti specifični, zaustavljeni ili veoma spori proces individualizacije 
u Srbiji. Glavni zaključak je da je moguće identificirati sljedeće promjene: odgađanje stupanja 
u brak te rađanja djece za veliku većinu populacije te izrazit porast broja izvanbračne djece 
nakon 1990. Ovo drugo je osobito vidljivo među mlađim ženama nepovoljnog položaja (sla-
bijeg obrazovanja, nižeg socijalnog statusa, iz ruralnih sredina ili manjih mjesta), koje su niti u 
braku niti u kohabitaciji. S druge strane, produžena je tranzicija mladih ljudi u period zrelosti. 
Strukturne i institucionalne barijere sputavaju njihov izbor ponašanja i pluralizaciju obrazaca 
života, što je vidljivo među njihovim vršnjacima diljem razvijene Europe i u bivšoj Jugoslaviji, 
s izuzetkom Slovenije. Patrijarhat i solidarnost bazirana na rodbinskim vezama opstaju u uvje-
tima teške ekonomske situacije, niskog životnog standarda i zakašnjelih europskih integracija.
Ključne riječi: životna zajednica, Srbija, postsocijalistička tranzicija, mladi ljudi, 
rodbinska solidarnost.
